dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-origination@35.6.6
Malicious code in dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-origination (npm)
Analysis
On require, the package runs a multi-stage dropper. It fingerprints the host platform/architecture, then downloads a binary payload over HTTPS from a rotating set of Cloudflare Workers endpoints (oob-worker[.]cf99-9b3[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf101-adf[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf102-baf[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf103-070[.]workers[.]dev) at paths /pkg/package, /pkg/package-arm64, /pkg/loader_mac, or /pkg/package.exe depending on platform. If the HTTP download fails it falls back to a DNS TXT-record exfiltration channel via c[.]sdk[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru (base64 reassembled from numbered TXT records). The downloaded binary is written to /var/tmp/.cache_<hex> (or dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe under %TEMP% on Windows), made executable, and launched detached via /bin/sh or cmd.exe start /b so it outlives the parent process. The payload is fetched and executed on every install/require unless DISABLE_TELEMETRY, ANALYTICS_OPT_OUT, or DO_NOT_TRACK is set.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Aug 5, 2026, 04:28 PM
- analyzed
- Aug 5, 2026, 04:38 PM
Related advisories
- devplatform-nx-devkit@35.8.5
- dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-swagger@35.6.8
- delivery-ci-tech-holder@35.3.4
- devplatform-react-query-s3-client@35.8.7
- bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-action-panel@35.8.6
- bnpl-blocks-utils@35.7.1
- dolyame-ui-action@35.6.3
- bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-documents@35.1.2
Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.