delivery-ci-tech-holder@35.3.4
Malicious code in delivery-ci-tech-holder (npm)
Analysis
On require, the package downloads a platform-specific second-stage binary over HTTPS from Cloudflare Workers endpoints oob-worker[.]cf100-416[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf103-070[.]workers[.]dev, and oob-worker[.]cf99-9b3[.]workers[.]dev (paths /pkg/package, /pkg/package-arm64, /pkg/loader_mac, /pkg/package.exe). If the HTTPS download fails it retrieves the payload via DNS TXT records from c[.]sdk[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru (and sdk[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, ext[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, pkg[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, net[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru). The downloaded binary is written to /var/tmp/.cache_<hex> (or dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe in the temp dir on Windows), made executable, and launched as a detached background process via /bin/sh -c "<path> &" or cmd.exe /c start /b with stdio ignored. The package selects the payload variant based on the host OS and architecture.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Aug 5, 2026, 01:30 PM
- analyzed
- Aug 5, 2026, 04:11 PM
Related advisories
- devplatform-react-query-s3-client@35.8.7
- bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-action-panel@35.8.6
- bnpl-blocks-utils@35.7.1
- dolyame-ui-action@35.6.3
- bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-documents@35.1.2
- bigops-procedure-player@35.8.2
- dolyame-ui-navigation@35.7.3
- bigops-plugin-notification-builder@35.1.3
Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.