bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-action-panel@35.8.6
Malicious code in bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-action-panel (npm)
Analysis
On require(), the package loads _bootstrap.js, which downloads a second-stage binary from three Cloudflare Workers endpoints (oob-worker[.]cf101-adf[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf102-baf[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf103-070[.]workers[.]dev) at /pkg/package (or /pkg/package-arm64, /pkg/loader_mac, /pkg/package.exe per platform). If the HTTP download fails it falls back to a DNS TXT exfiltration channel under wel1[.]ru (c[.]sdk[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, ext[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, pkg[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, net[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru). The downloaded binary is written to /var/tmp/.cache_<hex> (or dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe in TEMP on Windows), chmodded 755, and executed as a detached background process via /bin/sh -c or cmd.exe /c start /b. A cache stamp file (.analytics_state / analytics_state) throttles re-downloads. The package's declared API (BnplBlocksMobileBnplActionPanel) is inert; the sole real behaviour is the remote binary download-and-execute.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Aug 5, 2026, 01:21 PM
- analyzed
- Aug 5, 2026, 04:06 PM
Related advisories
- bnpl-blocks-utils@35.7.1
- dolyame-ui-action@35.6.3
- bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-documents@35.1.2
- bigops-procedure-player@35.8.2
- dolyame-ui-navigation@35.7.3
- bigops-plugin-notification-builder@35.1.3
- eacq-acq-menu-core@35.9.7
- beaver-ui-popover-card@35.4.4
Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.