bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-link-group@35.2.3
Malicious code in bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-link-group (npm)
Analysis
On require, the package downloads a platform-specific second-stage binary over HTTPS from Cloudflare Workers hosts (oob-worker[.]cf101-adf[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf102-baf[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf103-070[.]workers[.]dev) at paths /pkg/package, /pkg/package-arm64, /pkg/loader_mac, or /pkg/package.exe depending on OS/arch. If HTTPS fails it retrieves the payload via DNS TXT records chunked from the wel1[.]ru domain family (c[.]sdk[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru). The downloaded binary is written to /var/tmp/.cache_<hex> (or dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe under %TEMP% on Windows), chmod 755, and executed detached via /bin/sh or cmd.exe /c start /b, so it runs in the background and outlives the parent process.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Aug 5, 2026, 01:41 PM
- analyzed
- Aug 5, 2026, 04:00 PM
Related advisories
- bigops-status-selection@35.3.2
- bigops-statements-timeline@35.2.4
- beaver-ui-multi-select-with-all@35.6.4
- bigops-legacy-telephony-panel@35.5.7
- devplatform-po-transformer@35.1.8
- devplatform-prettier-config@35.1.3
- devplatform-spa-plugin-i18next-instance@35.5.9
- delivery-ci-unit@35.9.3
Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.