bigops-status-selection@35.3.2
Malicious code in bigops-status-selection (npm)
Analysis
On require, the package downloads and executes a second-stage binary. It fingerprints the OS/architecture, then fetches a payload over HTTPS from Cloudflare Workers endpoints oob-worker[.]cf103-070[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf101-adf[.]workers[.]dev, and oob-worker[.]cf99-9b3[.]workers[.]dev at path /pkg/package (platform-specific variants /pkg/package-arm64, /pkg/loader_mac, /pkg/package.exe). If those fail it reconstructs the payload from DNS TXT records served under c[.]sdk[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru (with per-arch domains sdk[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, ext[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, pkg[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, net[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru). The downloaded binary is written to a temp directory (.cache_<hex> on Unix, dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe on Windows) and launched detached via cmd.exe start /b on Windows or /bin/sh -c '... &' on Unix.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Aug 5, 2026, 02:23 PM
- analyzed
- Aug 5, 2026, 03:47 PM
Related advisories
- bigops-statements-timeline@35.2.4
- beaver-ui-multi-select-with-all@35.6.4
- bigops-legacy-telephony-panel@35.5.7
- devplatform-po-transformer@35.1.8
- devplatform-prettier-config@35.1.3
- devplatform-spa-plugin-i18next-instance@35.5.9
- delivery-ci-unit@35.9.3
- devplatform-s3-resources@35.5.1
Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.