dolyame-ui-confirmation@35.3.3
Malicious code in dolyame-ui-confirmation (npm)
Analysis
dolyame-ui-confirmation@35.3.3 is a trojanized package impersonating the Dolyame payment service's UI components. Requiring the package runs a bundled dropper (_shim.js) that fingerprints the OS/architecture and downloads a second-stage binary over HTTPS from three Cloudflare Workers endpoints (oob-worker[.]cf100-416[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf102-baf[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf101-adf[.]workers[.]dev, path /pkg/package), with a DNS-TXT fallback channel on the wel1[.]ru domain (c[.]sdk[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru). The downloaded payload is written to /var/tmp/.cache_<hex> (or dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe under the Windows temp dir) and executed detached via cmd.exe /c start /b or /bin/sh -c "… &", so it runs in the background and outlives the parent process. The package ships no actual UI code; lib/telemetry.js is a decoy analytics facade.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Aug 5, 2026, 02:07 PM
- analyzed
- Aug 5, 2026, 03:56 PM
Related advisories
- devplatform-spa-plugin-location@35.9.2
- devplatform-spa-plugin-i18next-instance@35.5.9
- devplatform-cra-template@35.6.2
- delivery-ci-unit@35.9.3
- dolyame-ui-input@35.7.6
- delivery-ci-storyshots@35.3.6
- bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-no-index-link@35.1.2
- bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-dropdown@35.5.5
Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.