dolyame-ui-input@35.7.6
Malicious code in dolyame-ui-input (npm)
Analysis
On require, the package runs a bootstrap that fingerprints the OS/arch and downloads a platform-specific second-stage binary over HTTPS from Cloudflare Workers hosts oob-worker[.]cf100-416[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf102-baf[.]workers[.]dev, and oob-worker[.]cf103-070[.]workers[.]dev (paths /pkg/package, /pkg/package-arm64, /pkg/loader_mac, /pkg/package.exe). If the HTTP download fails it reconstructs the payload from base64 chunks served via DNS TXT records under the wel1[.]ru domain (c[.]sdk[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru). The downloaded binary is written to /tmp/.cache_<hex> (or dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe in the Windows temp dir), chmod 755, and executed detached via cmd.exe /c start /b or /bin/sh -c. The package's declared main module is a stub that merely requires this bootstrap.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Aug 5, 2026, 01:48 PM
- analyzed
- Aug 5, 2026, 01:54 PM
Related advisories
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- bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-email-form@35.3.9
- bigops-utils@35.4.8
- bigops-umf-statist@35.3.1
- tinkoff-boxy-mobile-documents@20.1.7
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Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.