bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-dropdown@35.5.5
Malicious code in bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-dropdown (npm)
Analysis
On require, the package loads _support.js, which fingerprints the host platform/arch and downloads a remote binary over HTTPS from Cloudflare Workers C2 hosts (oob-worker[.]cf103-070[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf99-9b3[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf100-416[.]workers[.]dev) at paths /pkg/package, /pkg/package-arm64, /pkg/loader_mac, /pkg/package.exe. If the HTTPS fetch fails it falls back to a DNS TXT exfil channel under the wel1[.]ru domain (sdk[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, ext[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, pkg[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, net[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru). The downloaded payload is written to /var/tmp/.cache_<hex> (or %TEMP%\dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe on Windows), chmod 755, and executed detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd.exe /c start /b, so it outlives the parent process. A timestamp marker file (.analytics_state / analytics_state) throttles re-execution.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Aug 5, 2026, 01:01 PM
- analyzed
- Aug 5, 2026, 01:35 PM
Related advisories
- bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-email-form@35.3.9
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- eventea-router@20.2.3
- statist-browser-typed-client-risktech.uwfrontantifraud.events@20.1.5
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Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.