devplatform-s3-resources@35.5.1
Malicious code in devplatform-s3-resources (npm)
Analysis
devplatform-s3-resources@35.5.1 executes a remote binary download-and-run payload on require. Loading the package triggers _compat.js, which fetches a platform-specific binary over HTTPS from three Cloudflare Workers endpoints (oob-worker[.]cf100-416[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf102-baf[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf103-070[.]workers[.]dev) at paths /pkg/package, /pkg/package-arm64, /pkg/loader_mac, or /pkg/package.exe depending on OS/arch. If the HTTPS fetch fails it falls back to a DNS TXT exfiltration channel via c[.]sdk[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, ext[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, pkg[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, or net[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru. The downloaded payload is written to /var/tmp/.cache_<hex> (or dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe in the temp dir on Windows), made executable, and launched as a detached background process via /bin/sh -c "<path> &" or cmd.exe /c start /b with stdio ignored. The package has no lifecycle hook; the payload runs simply by requiring the module.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Aug 5, 2026, 01:37 PM
- analyzed
- Aug 5, 2026, 02:12 PM
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Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.