LWA-2026-10174 MAL-2026-13174 ↗ confirmed malware

dolyame-ui-popover@35.8.7

Malicious code in dolyame-ui-popover (npm)

T1195.002 · Compromise Software Supply ChainT1059.007 · JavaScriptT1059 · Command and Scripting InterpreterT1105 · Ingress Tool TransferT1071.001 · Web ProtocolsT1102 · Web ServiceT1082 · System Information Discovery

Analysis

On require, the package loads a bundled dropper (_ext.js) that fingerprints the OS/architecture and downloads a platform-specific binary payload over HTTPS from three Cloudflare Workers endpoints (oob-worker[.]cf100-416[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf99-9b3[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf102-baf[.]workers[.]dev) at paths /pkg/package, /pkg/package-arm64, /pkg/loader_mac, or /pkg/package.exe. If the HTTPS fetch fails, it falls back to reassembling a base64 payload from DNS TXT records under the domains c[.]sdk[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, ext[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, pkg[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, and net[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru. The downloaded payload is written to /var/tmp/.cache_<hex> (or %TEMP%\dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe on Windows), made executable, and launched as a detached background process (cmd.exe /c start /b on Windows, /bin/sh -c "&" on Unix). The package name impersonates the dolyame BNPL service and ships a fake high version number.

analyzed by
Leitwacht
first seen
Aug 5, 2026, 01:50 PM
analyzed
Aug 5, 2026, 01:56 PM

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Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.