testpackage83@1.0.1
Malicious code in testpackage83 (npm)
Analysis
testpackage83 runs a postinstall hook (scripts/install.js → src/download2.js) that downloads an executable from a disposable, random-link file-drop host and installs it as a browser binary. The download URL is hxxps://sendit[.]sh/DAyiB/vZxBj[.]bat with the host platform and CPU architecture appended as query parameters; the retrieved archive is written to ~/.celest/bin/chrome (mode 0755) and src/browser.js launches it through puppeteer-core with --no-sandbox, --no-zygote and related flags. Nothing pins the payload to a hash, size or vendor distribution channel, so whatever the operator serves at that path is executed on every machine that installs the package; a .bat-suffixed payload is renamed to "chrome" on disk. A second copy of the downloader, src/download.js, is identical except its URL constant is empty. The install step can be skipped with the CELEST_SKIP_DOWNLOAD=1 environment variable. The package performs no credential, token, .npmrc or wallet collection and contains no obfuscated code; the risk is opaque remote code execution at install and at first browser launch. src/index.js is a thin puppeteer request wrapper.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Nov 15, 2026, 11:02 PM
- analyzed
- Nov 16, 2026, 12:07 AM
Related advisories
- testpackage83@1.0.0 same package
- amanexfujimiya-baileys@8.6.25
- @devil-fight/baileys@1.0.5
- @xzvbailss/baileys@6.0.8
- sol-wallet-adapater@1.0.2
- base65-77x@0.0.0-stage
- base65-15x@5.0.2
- base65-77x@5.0.2
Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.