LWA-2026-14021 MAL-2026-18819 ↗ confirmed malware

@devil-fight/baileys@1.0.5

Malicious code in @devil-fight/baileys (npm)

T1195.002 · Compromise Software Supply ChainT1059.007 · JavaScriptT1036 · MasqueradingT1071.001 · Web ProtocolsT1098 · Account Manipulation

Analysis

This package is an unofficial fork of the Baileys WhatsApp library that, without the operator's knowledge, uses the operator's authenticated WhatsApp session to join a third party's group and follow two third-party newsletter channels. lib/Socket/newsletter.js contains three module-level setTimeout(..., 90000) blocks inside makeNewsletterSocket; they run 90 seconds after any consumer creates a socket and: (1) call sock.groupAcceptInvite('E9AX0T7jKJ48VFAI4zuxC8'), joining the group behind hxxps://chat[.]whatsapp[.]com/E9AX0T7jKJ48VFAI4zuxC8; (2) and (3) issue a follow query (QueryIds.FOLLOW, xmlns "w:mex") against the base64-obfuscated newsletter JIDs MTIwMzYzMzg5MDEyMDk0ODU2QG5ld3NsZXR0ZXI= and MTIwMzYzNDIzODkwMDU0Nzg3QG5ld3NsZXR0ZXI=, i.e. 120363389012094856@newsletter and 120363423890054787@newsletter. Separately, lib/Socket/dugong.js hard-codes a forwarded-newsletter tag on outgoing forwarded messages pointing at 120363297591152843@newsletter under the display name "shenvn.". The 90-second delay and the base64 encoding of the channel identifiers hide the account actions from the operator; failures are swallowed in empty catch blocks. Errors are suppressed so the account changes happen silently. The preinstall hook (engine-requirements.js) only checks the Node.js major version and is unrelated. No npm/GitHub/cloud tokens, SSH/AWS credential files, environment variables or local files are read or transmitted; all traffic goes to WhatsApp infrastructure.

analyzed by
Leitwacht
first seen
Nov 15, 2026, 08:57 AM
analyzed
Nov 15, 2026, 09:03 AM

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Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.