testpackage83@1.0.0
Malicious code in testpackage83 (npm)
Analysis
This package executes a remote, server-selected executable at install time from a bare IP address over unencrypted HTTP. The postinstall hook (scripts/install.js) calls src/download2.js, which immediately issues GET hxxp://185[.]212[.]128[.]180/chromedriver[.]bat?platform=<os>&arch=<arch>, follows up to 10 redirects, saves the body to ~/.celest/bin/.download.tmp, gunzips/unzips it, moves it to ~/.celest/bin/chrome (chrome.exe on Windows), sets mode 0755, and src/browser.js launches it via puppeteer-core with --no-sandbox and --disable-setuid-sandbox as the "custom patched Chromium" the README advertises. No checksum, signature, certificate or pinned version is verified; the only validation is a content-type check, an extension list and a two-byte PE/ZIP header sniff, all of which a malicious executable passes. The URL path names a .bat while the code claims to fetch a Chrome archive, and the host is unrelated to any Chromium distribution channel, so the delivered payload is entirely controlled by the operator's server and varies per install (platform/arch are appended to the request). The package reads no credentials, tokens, environment values or files and sends no local data out; the exposure is the arbitrary remote binary fetched and run on the installer's machine. Network IOC: hxxp://185[.]212[.]128[.]180/chromedriver[.]bat (port 80). Installer opt-out: CELEST_SKIP_DOWNLOAD=1.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Nov 14, 2026, 08:59 PM
- analyzed
- Nov 14, 2026, 09:00 PM
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Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.