sol-wallet-adapater@1.0.2
Malicious code in sol-wallet-adapater (npm)
Analysis
The publish is named sol-wallet-adapater and described as a Solana Wallet Adapter, but its bundled README, console output and install paths belong to an unrelated product called celest-browser, and the code contains no Solana or wallet functionality at all. Its only runtime behaviour is delivered by a postinstall lifecycle script (scripts/install.js) that runs src/download2.js: it requests hxxps://peerbox[.]cloud/s/nSXWTpGsFd4qmzNJqWYs4w?platform=<process[.]platform>&arch=<process.arch> (a file-sharing share link, not a vendor release host), streams the response to ~/.celest/bin/.download.tmp, optionally gunzips and extracts it with extract-zip, writes the result to ~/.celest/bin/chrome (chrome.exe on Windows), chmods it 0755, and src/browser.js then launches that binary through puppeteer-core with --no-sandbox --disable-setuid-sandbox. A CELEST_SKIP_DOWNLOAD=1 environment variable only defers the fetch until first API use, so the unsigned remote executable lands on the host either at install time or on first require. Nothing in the package verifies a signature or checksum of the downloaded archive, and the downloaded binary is fully attacker-controlled. The same download logic is duplicated in src/download.js with the URL deliberately left empty.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Nov 13, 2026, 12:30 AM
- analyzed
- Nov 13, 2026, 12:36 AM
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Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.