LWA-2026-14073 confirmed malware

@wanzforme/bails@6.0.0

Malicious code in @wanzforme/bails (npm)

T1195.002 · Compromise Software Supply ChainT1059.007 · JavaScriptT1105 · Ingress Tool TransferT1204.002 · Malicious File

Analysis

@wanzforme/bails is a fork of the Baileys WhatsApp client library that silently subscribes the linking user's WhatsApp account to a hardcoded channel. In lib/Socket/newsletter.js a "connection.update" handler runs 10 seconds after the socket reports "open" and sends a FOLLOW IQ (query id 7871414976211147) for the hardcoded JID 120363380357951328@newsletter, retrying twice at 20-second intervals before giving up. The follow is enabled by default and can only be suppressed with an undocumented config option (autoFollowNewsletters: false); the README documents newsletter message sending but never mentions the automatic subscription. The same hardcoded JID is embedded in lib/Socket/luxu.js under the name "WanzLonely", where it is stamped into forwardedNewsletterMessageInfo on relayed event and poll-result messages, attributing the user's outgoing content to that channel. The package also ships a preinstall hook (node ./engine-requirements.js) that only performs a Node.js >= 20 version check, and declares a dependency range on cache-manager ^7.2.8, which resolves to 7.2.10, a release that carries a malicious install payload. libsignal is pulled from a mutable third-party GitHub fork (github:wanzchil/libsignal-node) instead of the upstream source, with no commit pin. No credential, token, environment or file exfiltration was found in this version.

analyzed by
Leitwacht
first seen
Nov 14, 2026, 11:55 AM
analyzed
Nov 15, 2026, 11:09 PM
weekly installs
531

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Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.