LWA-2026-13649 MAL-2026-18608 ↗ confirmed malware

gugodapis@1.0.0

Malicious code in gugodapis (npm)

T1105 · Ingress Tool TransferT1059 · Command and Scripting InterpreterT1204.002 · Malicious FileT1027 · Obfuscated Files or Information

Analysis

gugodapis@1.0.0 ships no real library functionality. Its only file, gugodapis.js, exports a single function, executeRemoteBatchScript(), that downloads a Windows batch file named anmern.bat from a Discord CDN attachment URL and executes it on the host. The function fetches hxxps://cdn[.]discordapp[.]com/attachments/1230359189717782621/1238125874927108219/anmern[.]bat?[.][.]. with axios (arraybuffer response), writes the response body to path.join(process.env.TEMP || '/tmp', 'anmern.bat'), and immediately runs the written file with child_process.exec(). There is no signature check, hash check or destination allowlist, so whatever the remote attachment contains executes with the caller's privileges. The package declares no bin entry and no install-time lifecycle hook, so the download-and-execute only happens when a consuming application calls the exported function; the dropper is therefore disguised as a utility module (its file header is labelled "myapi.js"). The staging host is a Discord attachment (cdn[.]discordapp[.]com), a service commonly abused to host short-lived payloads, and the URL carries expiring signed parameters (ex=/is=/hm=). package.json additionally lists Node built-ins fs, path and child_process as ordinary npm dependencies, which resolves them to unrelated third-party registry packages. The second-stage batch file (anmern.bat) is remote and not part of the package, so its contents are unknown from the package bytes.

analyzed by
Leitwacht
first seen
Nov 4, 2026, 09:05 AM
analyzed
Nov 4, 2026, 09:05 AM

Related advisories

browse all confirmed advisories →

Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.