LWA-2026-13730 confirmed malware

nullsub@1.11.15

Malicious code in nullsub (npm)

T1027 · Obfuscated Files or InformationT1497.001 · System ChecksT1622 · Debugger EvasionT1027.009 · Embedded PayloadsT1055 · Process InjectionT1059 · Command and Scripting InterpreterT1105 · Ingress Tool TransferT1082 · System Information DiscoveryT1057 · Process DiscoveryT1012 · Query RegistryT1112 · Modify RegistryT1016 · System Network Configuration DiscoveryT1204.002 · Malicious FileT1195.002 · Compromise Software Supply Chain

Analysis

nullsub ships a single 1.3 MB unsigned Windows PE, NULLSUB.exe, with no JavaScript and no install hooks; package.json pins os to win32 and the README tells users to fetch the binary and double-click it. It is described as a "portable Windows activator" for desktop AI apps, i.e. a licence-bypass tool, but the binary is built to hide from inspection. It imports IsDebuggerPresent, CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent and NtQueryInformationProcess/NtQueryInformationThread, scans for debugger windows and processes (ollydbg, x64dbg/x32dbg, windbg/windbgx, dnspy, ImmunityDebugger, ida/ida64, radare2) and for virtualisation via the CPUID hypervisor bit, SMBIOS, system firmware tables, and the processes and drivers of VMware, VirtualBox, QEMU, Parallels, Xen and Hyper-V (vmtoolsd, VBoxService, qemu-ga, prl_tools, xenservice, vmusrvc and their .sys drivers). It contains a manual in-memory PE loader - diagnostic strings for header copy, section mapping, relocation, import/IAT fixup, TLS callback invocation and memory-protection changes ("[ldr] hdr copied", "[ldr] reloc delta", "[ldr] imports ok iat", "[ldr] prot ok") plus CRYPT_TRACE/"[sec]" markers and FindResourceW/LockResource/SizeofResource - and builds a path with GetTempPathW that it launches via CreateProcessW/ShellExecuteW ("[temp] launched %ls"), consistent with an embedded encrypted payload being unpacked to a temporary file and executed as a second stage. The binary also creates, writes and deletes registry keys (RegCreateKeyExW/RegSetValueExW/RegDeleteTreeW), enumerates processes and network adapters (Process32First/Next, GetAdaptersAddresses) and reads host fingerprint data (GetSystemFirmwareTable, GlobalMemoryStatusEx, GetVolumeInformationW, GetComputerNameW). No plaintext C2 host, IP, URL or credential-store path appears in the outer binary; any command-and-control would reside in the encrypted embedded stage. Observed artifacts: download URL hxxps://cdn[.]jsdelivr[.]net/npm/nullsub/NULLSUB[.]exe and homepage hxxps://nullsub[.]ink.

analyzed by
Leitwacht
first seen
Nov 6, 2026, 04:05 PM
analyzed
Nov 6, 2026, 04:07 PM

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Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.