nullsub@1.11.16
Malicious code in nullsub (npm)
Analysis
This package contains no JavaScript. It is a delivery vehicle for a Windows executable: NULLSUB.exe (1,300,309 bytes, x64 PE, package is win32-only), plus a second copy inside NULLSUB[.]zip, advertised as a "portable Windows activator for desktop AI apps" that the reader is told to download and double-click (the README points at hxxps://cdn[.]jsdelivr[.]net/npm/nullsub/NULLSUB[.]exe and hxxps://nullsub[.]ink). The binary is an encrypted-payload loader with active defence evasion, evidenced by its own strings and imports: - Hidden stage: "carrier=1 chunks=5", "[payload] %zu bytes", "[crypto] decrypted, magic=%02x%02x%02x%02x", "[crc] chunk %u mismatch" — a five-chunk encrypted blob decrypted at startup, then memory-mapped and executed by a bundled reflective PE loader ("[ldr] mapping %zu bytes", "[ldr] relocs ok", "[ldr] .NET image, launch mode", "map failed (%d), temp fallback" → "[temp] launched %ls"). It also skips its own anti-sleep delay ("[sleep] skipped (fast start)"). - AV/EDR neutering: "[patch] %s!%s stomped" together with AmsiScanBuffer, AmsiScanString, AmsiOpenSession (amsi.dll) and EtwEventWrite, EtwEventWriteFull, EventWrite (ntdll.dll / advapi32.dll) — the process patches out AMSI scanning and ETW telemetry before running the payload. - Privilege escalation: if not elevated it hijacks "Software\Classes\ms-settings\Shell\Open\command" with DelegateExecute and falls back to computerdefaults.exe / fodhelper.exe ("[uac] not elevated, hijacking ms-settings", "computerdefaults failed … trying fodhelper", "[uac] cleaned"). - Analysis evasion and host fingerprinting: CPUID hypervisor checks, IsDebuggerPresent / CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent, process enumeration via CreateToolhelp32Snapshot, GetAdaptersAddresses (MAC/adapters), GetVolumeInformationW, GetSystemFirmwareTable and GlobalMemoryStatusEx, plus a check for loaded drivers under \drivers\. - Imports include CreateProcessW, VirtualAlloc, VirtualProtect, WriteFile and RegSetValueExW. No command-and-control hostname or IP is present in the binary; the second stage exists only in encrypted form, so its network indicators are not observable from the package itself.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Nov 6, 2026, 10:15 AM
- analyzed
- Nov 6, 2026, 10:16 AM
Related advisories
- nullsub@1.11.15 same package
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Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.