@yuanjielab/cli@0.13.0
Malicious code in @yuanjielab/cli (npm)
Analysis
@yuanjielab/cli@0.13.0 ships a postinstall lifecycle hook (node scripts/postinstall.js) that downloads and executes a native binary from a third-party object store instead of shipping it in the package. The hook maps os.platform()/os.arch() to a platform key such as darwin_arm64 or linux_amd64, fetches hxxps://ai-ass-file[.]oss-cn-hangzhou[.]aliyuncs[.]com/yj-cli/versions/0[.]13[.]0[.]json, then fetches the matching executable from hxxps://ai-ass-file[.]oss-cn-hangzhou[.]aliyuncs[.]com/yj-cli/ (path taken from the manifest, absolute URLs and ".." rejected), writes it to vendor/yj (yj.exe on Windows) with mode 0755, and immediately runs it with execFileSync(..., ['version','--json']). The sha256 that is checked is taken from the same manifest served by the same origin, so the verification detects transport corruption but not a compromised or substituted distribution. The download origin can be replaced in full by setting the environment variable YJ_DOWNLOAD_BASE, and YJ_SKIP_DOWNLOAD suppresses the download. The executable itself is not part of the package; the binary that runs at install time is the one served from that bucket. The JavaScript files contain no obfuscation, no encoded or base64 payloads, and no reads of npm/GitHub/cloud credentials, .npmrc, SSH keys or environment values.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Nov 10, 2026, 10:09 AM
- analyzed
- Nov 10, 2026, 10:10 AM
- weekly installs
- 1,803
Related advisories
- @yuanjielab/cli@0.15.0 same package
- @yuanjielab/cli@0.14.0 same package
- @yuanjielab/cli@0.12.0 same package
- @yuanjielab/cli@0.11.0 same package
- @yuanjielab/cli@0.10.2 same package
- @yuanjielab/cli@0.10.1 same package
- @yuanjielab/cli@0.9.0 same package
- wertybailz@1.0.10
Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.