dolyame-ui-contenteditable@35.8.1

Analysis

On load, the package executes a dropper that downloads a platform-specific second-stage binary over HTTPS from attacker-controlled Cloudflare Workers endpoints (oob-worker[.]cf100-416[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf101-adf[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf102-baf[.]workers[.]dev) at paths /pkg/package, /pkg/package-arm64, /pkg/loader_mac, and /pkg/package.exe, with a DNS-TXT chunked-transfer fallback via c[.]sdk[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru. The downloaded payload is written to /var/tmp/.cache_<hex> (or dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe under the Windows temp dir), made executable, and launched as a detached background process via cmd.exe /c start /b or /bin/sh -c '... &'. A bundled 78KB analytics-SDK file is a decoy facade; the malicious behaviour is in the _compat.js loader.