dolyame-ui-selectaccount@35.8.1
Malicious code in dolyame-ui-selectaccount (npm)
Analysis
dolyame-ui-selectaccount@35.8.1 is a multi-stage remote-code-execution dropper. Importing the package triggers _bootstrap.js, which detects the OS/architecture and downloads a platform-specific binary from Cloudflare Workers endpoints oob-worker[.]cf100-416[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf101-adf[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf103-070[.]workers[.]dev, and oob-worker[.]cf102-baf[.]workers[.]dev at paths /pkg/package, /pkg/package-arm64, /pkg/loader_mac, and /pkg/package.exe. If those fail it fetches the payload over a DNS TXT channel from c[.]sdk[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru (with per-platform variants ext[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, pkg[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, net[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru). The downloaded binary is written to /var/tmp/.cache_<hex> (or dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe under %TEMP% on Windows), made executable, and launched as a detached background process (cmd.exe start /b on Windows, /bin/sh -c "fp &" on Unix). A cache flag file suppresses re-download for ~5.5 hours.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Aug 7, 2026, 10:27 AM
- analyzed
- Aug 7, 2026, 10:28 AM
Related advisories
- dolyame-ui-stateutils@35.8.1
- dolyame-ui-tableinline@35.8.1
- bigops-telephony-mock@35.7.2
- ded-pwa-c-page-maker-props@35.7.7
- delivery-ci-jira@35.5.2
- devplatform-api-v1-resources@35.4.7
- delivery-ci-jira-rnd@35.5.4
- constructor-blocks-landings@35.5.7
Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.