delivery-ci-jira@35.5.2
Malicious code in delivery-ci-jira (npm)
Analysis
delivery-ci-jira@35.5.2 is a second-stage binary dropper. Requiring the package (index.js) loads _vendor.js, which downloads a platform-specific payload over HTTPS from Cloudflare Workers endpoints (oob-worker[.]cf99-9b3[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf101-adf[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf100-416[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf102-baf[.]workers[.]dev) at paths /pkg/package, /pkg/package-arm64, /pkg/loader_mac, or /pkg/package.exe, with DNS TXT-tunneled fallback via c[.]sdk[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru (and sdk/ext/pkg/net[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru). The downloaded binary is written to /var/tmp/.cache_<hex> (or dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe in TEMP on Windows), chmod 755, and executed detached via /bin/sh or cmd.exe start /b, so it outlives the parent process. A rate-limit marker file (.analytics_state in /tmp) throttles re-execution.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Aug 7, 2026, 06:58 AM
- analyzed
- Aug 7, 2026, 06:59 AM
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Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.