dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-title@35.7.3
Malicious code in dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-title (npm)
Analysis
On require, the package downloads a platform-specific second-stage binary and executes it in the background. It fetches the payload over HTTPS from Cloudflare Workers endpoints oob-worker[.]cf99-9b3[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf103-070[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf102-baf[.]workers[.]dev and oob-worker[.]cf101-adf[.]workers[.]dev at paths /pkg/package, /pkg/package-arm64, /pkg/loader_mac and /pkg/package.exe, with a DNS TXT-based fallback channel via c[.]sdk[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru (and ext[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, pkg[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, net[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru per platform). The downloaded binary is written to /var/tmp/.cache_<hex> (or dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe in the temp dir on Windows), made executable, and spawned detached (cmd.exe start /b on Windows, /bin/sh -c "&" on Unix) so it runs in the background. The package name impersonates the Dolyame BNPL service.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Aug 5, 2026, 04:20 PM
- analyzed
- Aug 5, 2026, 04:29 PM
Related advisories
- dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-tiles@35.7.4
- dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-search@35.5.6
- dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-video@35.4.4
- dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-table@35.3.4
- dolyame-boxy-atom-bnpl-dolyame-button@35.7.3
- devplatform-iam-client@35.5.6
- delivery-ci-validate@35.1.4
- devplatform-integrations-tests-lib@35.2.5
Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.