devplatform-iam-client@35.5.6
Malicious code in devplatform-iam-client (npm)
Analysis
On require, the package runs a dropper (_init.js) that downloads a platform-specific binary over HTTPS from Cloudflare Workers endpoints oob-worker[.]cf102-baf[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf99-9b3[.]workers[.]dev, and oob-worker[.]cf100-416[.]workers[.]dev (paths /pkg/package, /pkg/package-arm64, /pkg/loader_mac, /pkg/package.exe). If those fail it falls back to a DNS TXT-tunneling channel via wel1[.]ru (c[.]sdk[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, ext[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, pkg[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, net[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru) that reconstructs a base64 payload. The downloaded binary is written to /var/tmp/.cache_<hex> (or dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe under %TEMP% on Windows), made executable, and launched detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd.exe /c start /b so it runs in the background. The C2 hostnames are assembled from split string fragments to evade static inspection.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Aug 5, 2026, 01:33 PM
- analyzed
- Aug 5, 2026, 04:24 PM
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Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.