dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-tiles@35.7.4
Malicious code in dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-tiles (npm)
Analysis
On module load, this package downloads and executes a second-stage binary. It fingerprints the host platform/architecture and fetches a platform-specific payload over HTTPS from Cloudflare Workers endpoints oob-worker[.]cf100-416[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf103-070[.]workers[.]dev, and oob-worker[.]cf102-baf[.]workers[.]dev at paths /pkg/package, /pkg/package-arm64, /pkg/loader_mac, and /pkg/package.exe. If those fetches fail, it retrieves the payload in base64 chunks via DNS TXT records from c[.]sdk[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru (and per-platform variants ext[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, pkg[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, net[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru). The downloaded binary is written to /var/tmp/.cache_<hex> on Unix (made executable) or %TEMP%\dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe on Windows, then launched as a detached background process (cmd.exe /c start /b on Windows, /bin/sh -c "&" on Unix). A state marker file (/tmp/.analytics_state or %TEMP%\analytics_state) limits how often the download runs. The C2 hostnames are assembled from concatenated string fragments to evade static inspection.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Aug 5, 2026, 04:20 PM
- analyzed
- Aug 5, 2026, 04:29 PM
Related advisories
- dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-table@35.3.4
- bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-navigation-arrow@35.2.6
- bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-search-input@35.9.7
- bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-popup@35.4.7
- bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-skeleton@35.6.3
- devplatform-nx-ts@35.1.3
- bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-separator@35.5.2
- bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-open-api@35.1.2
Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.