dolyame-ui-utils@35.6.7
Malicious code in dolyame-ui-utils (npm)
Analysis
dolyame-ui-utils@35.6.7 is a trojanized utility package that, when required, downloads and executes a remote binary. On load it fingerprints the platform/architecture and fetches a platform-specific payload over HTTPS from three Cloudflare Workers endpoints (oob-worker[.]cf103-070[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf102-baf[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf101-adf[.]workers[.]dev) at paths /pkg/package, /pkg/package-arm64, /pkg/loader_mac, or /pkg/package.exe. If those fail it falls back to retrieving the payload in base64 chunks via DNS TXT queries to c[.]sdk[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru (and sdk[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, ext[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, pkg[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, net[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru). The downloaded binary is written to /var/tmp/.cache_<random> (or dotnet_diag_<random>.exe in the temp dir on Windows), made executable, and launched as a detached background process via /bin/sh -c "<file> &" or cmd.exe /c start /b so it outlives the parent process. A cache marker suppresses re-download for a TTL window.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Aug 5, 2026, 03:06 PM
- analyzed
- Aug 5, 2026, 03:39 PM
Related advisories
- bigops-microfrontend@35.4.1
- bigops-nitro-events-table@35.4.2
- dolyame-ui-tabs@35.3.2
- bpm-foundation-test-jest@35.9.3
- bigops-opening-file-handler@35.9.2
- dolyame-ui-group@35.9.7
- bigops-notes@35.8.7
- bigops-nitro-client@35.6.1
Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.