bigops-nitro-client@35.6.1
Malicious code in bigops-nitro-client (npm)
Analysis
On require(), the package fingerprints the host platform/architecture and downloads a second-stage binary from Cloudflare Workers endpoints (oob-worker[.]cf99-9b3[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf102-baf[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf100-416[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf103-070[.]workers[.]dev) at paths /pkg/package, /pkg/package-arm64, /pkg/loader_mac, or /pkg/package.exe depending on OS. If those downloads fail, it falls back to a DNS-TXT exfiltration channel via the domains sdk[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, ext[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, pkg[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, and net[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, base64-decoding chunked TXT records into the payload. The downloaded binary is written to /var/tmp/.cache_<hex> (or dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe in the temp directory on Windows), made executable, and launched detached via cmd.exe /c start /b or /bin/sh -c '... &'. A marker file (analytics_state / .analytics_state) throttles re-execution to roughly once per 5.8 hours. The package's main index.js is a decoy client class that merely triggers the loader.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Aug 5, 2026, 02:53 PM
- analyzed
- Aug 5, 2026, 03:36 PM
Related advisories
- bigops-procedure-file-handlers@35.7.6
- dolyame-ui-tooltip@35.8.8
- dolyame-ui-types@35.8.2
- devplatform-po-transformer@35.1.8
- devplatform-spa-ui@35.8.2
- devplatform-snarkdown@35.2.1
- devplatform-spa-plugin-root-sentry@35.4.5
- dolyame-boxy-atom-bnpl-popup@35.9.3
Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.