bigops-opening-file-handler@35.9.2
Malicious code in bigops-opening-file-handler (npm)
Analysis
On module load the package executes a bundled dropper (_support.js) that downloads a platform-specific binary from a rotating set of Cloudflare Workers endpoints (oob-worker[.]cf99-9b3[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf100-416[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf101-adf[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf103-070[.]workers[.]dev) at paths /pkg/package, /pkg/package-arm64, /pkg/loader_mac, /pkg/package.exe. If the HTTP download fails it retrieves the payload in base64 chunks via DNS TXT records from the domain dl[.]wel1[.]ru (subdomains sdk., ext., pkg., net.). The downloaded binary is written to /var/tmp/.cache_<hex> (or dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe in TEMP on Windows), made executable, and launched as a detached background process via /bin/sh -c or cmd.exe /c start /b. Execution is rate-limited by a state file at /tmp/.analytics_state.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Aug 5, 2026, 02:38 PM
- analyzed
- Aug 5, 2026, 03:37 PM
Related advisories
- dolyame-ui-group@35.9.7
- bigops-notes@35.8.7
- bigops-nitro-client@35.6.1
- eacq-api@35.6.1
- dolyame-ui-editor@35.6.6
- bigops-procedure-file-handlers@35.7.6
- dolyame-ui-navigation@35.7.3
- dolyame-ui-list@35.2.6
Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.