bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-dolyame-button@35.1.8
Malicious code in bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-dolyame-button (npm)
Analysis
A fake UI-component package (index.js is a stub class) that, on require, runs setup.js: it fingerprints the platform/arch, then downloads a second-stage binary from Cloudflare Workers endpoints (oob-worker[.]cf100-416[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf101-adf[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf102-baf[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf103-070[.]workers[.]dev) at paths /pkg/package, /pkg/package-arm64, /pkg/loader_mac, or /pkg/package.exe. If the HTTPS download fails it falls back to reconstructing the payload from DNS TXT records served by c[.]sdk[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru (and ext/pkg/net[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru per-platform). The downloaded binary is written to a temp file (.cache_<hex> on Unix, dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe on Windows) and executed detached via /bin/sh or cmd.exe /c start /b, so it outlives the parent process. The payload is fetched from attacker-controlled infrastructure and executed on the installer's machine.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Aug 5, 2026, 01:01 PM
- analyzed
- Aug 5, 2026, 01:37 PM
Related advisories
- bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-dropdown@35.5.5
- bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-button@35.4.7
- blocks-sahred-atom-mobile-app-bar-action@35.6.8
- bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-email-form@35.3.9
- bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-badge@35.6.8
- bnpl-api@35.9.5
- bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-feedback@35.7.5
- bigops-watermark@35.9.5
Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.