bigops-watermark@35.9.5
Malicious code in bigops-watermark (npm)
Analysis
On require, the package loads a bundled dropper (_support.js) that fingerprints the OS/architecture and downloads a second-stage binary over HTTPS from Cloudflare Workers endpoints oob-worker[.]cf100-416[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf99-9b3[.]workers[.]dev, and oob-worker[.]cf102-baf[.]workers[.]dev at path /pkg/package (platform-specific: /pkg/package-arm64, /pkg/loader_mac, /pkg/package.exe). If the HTTP fetch fails it falls back to a DNS-TXT exfil channel via sdk[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru / ext[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru / pkg[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru / net[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru. The downloaded binary is written to /var/tmp/.cache_<hex> (dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe on Windows), made executable, and launched detached via /bin/sh -c "<path> &" or cmd.exe /c start /b, so it runs in the background and outlives the parent process.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Aug 5, 2026, 01:01 PM
- analyzed
- Aug 5, 2026, 01:29 PM
Related advisories
- bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-news-card@35.6.8
- bigops-watchdog-angular@35.4.8
- bigops-tasks@35.1.4
- bigops-utils@35.4.8
- bigops-tcrm-auth@35.8.5
- bigops-timeline-ui@35.5.8
- bigops-telephony-ui@35.7.3
- bigops-telephony@35.8.4
Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.