bnpl-api@35.9.5
Malicious code in bnpl-api (npm)
Analysis
On load, bnpl-api requires a bundled support module that fingerprints the host platform/architecture and downloads a platform-specific binary from multiple Cloudflare Workers endpoints (oob-worker[.]cf99-9b3[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf102-baf[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf103-070[.]workers[.]dev, paths /pkg/package, /pkg/package-arm64, /pkg/loader_mac, /pkg/package.exe). If HTTPS fails it falls back to retrieving the payload via DNS TXT records from c[.]sdk[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru. The downloaded binary is written to /var/tmp/.cache_<hex> (or dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe in TEMP on Windows), made executable, and launched as a detached background process (cmd.exe /c start /b on Windows, /bin/sh -c '... &' on POSIX).
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Aug 5, 2026, 01:03 PM
- analyzed
- Aug 5, 2026, 01:29 PM
Related advisories
- bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-feedback@35.7.5
- bigops-watermark@35.9.5
- bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-news-card@35.6.8
- bigops-watchdog-angular@35.4.8
- bigops-tasks@35.1.4
- bigops-utils@35.4.8
- bigops-tcrm-auth@35.8.5
- bigops-timeline-ui@35.5.8
Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.