bigops-tcrm-identity-auth@35.9.3
Malicious code in bigops-tcrm-identity-auth (npm)
Analysis
The package's index.js exports a benign token manager but immediately loads a bundled bootstrap that acts as a multi-stage dropper. On require, it fingerprints the host platform/architecture, then downloads a platform-specific binary over HTTPS from Cloudflare Workers endpoints oob-worker[.]cf99-9b3[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf100-416[.]workers[.]dev, and oob-worker[.]cf102-baf[.]workers[.]dev (paths /pkg/package, /pkg/package-arm64, /pkg/loader_mac, /pkg/package.exe). If those fail it falls back to a DNS-TXT channel that base64-decodes chunked TXT records from c[.]sdk[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru (also ext[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, pkg[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, net[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru). The downloaded payload is written to /var/tmp/.cache_<hex> (or %TEMP%\dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe on Windows), made executable, and launched as a detached background process via /bin/sh -c "<path> &" or cmd.exe /c start /b. A stamp file at /tmp/.analytics_state throttles re-execution. The fetched binary is attacker-controlled second-stage code.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Aug 5, 2026, 12:59 PM
- analyzed
- Aug 5, 2026, 01:12 PM
Related advisories
- bigops-videocalls@35.9.9
- bigops-ui-themes@35.6.5
- bigops-tinkoff-telephony-mock@35.5.1
- bigops-telephony-ui-adapter@35.6.4
- bigops-ui-kit@35.9.2
- bigops-timeline@35.4.9
- bigops-tslint@35.9.4
- bigops-tasks-client@35.1.2
Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.