bigops-telephony-ui-adapter@35.6.4
Malicious code in bigops-telephony-ui-adapter (npm)
Analysis
On require, the package executes a dropper (lib/_init.js) that downloads a platform-specific binary and runs it in the background. It fingerprints the OS/arch, then fetches the payload over HTTPS from three rotated C2 hosts — oob-worker[.]cf100-416[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf101-adf[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf103-070[.]workers[.]dev — at paths /pkg/package, /pkg/package-arm64, /pkg/loader_mac, or /pkg/package.exe. If the HTTPS fetch fails it falls back to a DNS-TXT exfil channel: it resolves c[.]sdk[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru to get a chunk count, then reassembles base64 chunks from numbered TXT records under sdk[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru / ext[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru / pkg[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru / net[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru. The downloaded payload is written to /tmp/.cache_<hex> (or %TEMP%\dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe on Windows), made executable, and launched detached via /bin/sh -c "&" or cmd.exe /c start /b, so it outlives the parent process. The package also ships a decoy "analytics SDK" (lib/telemetry.js) that is never used by the dropper. The remote binary is a second-stage payload fetched from attacker-controlled infrastructure at install/require time.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Aug 5, 2026, 12:58 PM
- analyzed
- Aug 5, 2026, 01:07 PM
Related advisories
- bigops-ui-kit@35.9.2
- bigops-timeline@35.4.9
- bigops-tslint@35.9.4
- bigops-tasks-client@35.1.2
- bigops-stylelint@35.4.3
- bigops-umf-statist@35.3.1
- @zahlen/checkout-angular@0.1.4
- @zahlen/checkout-react@0.1.1
Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.