bigops-videocalls@35.9.9
Malicious code in bigops-videocalls (npm)
Analysis
bigops-videocalls@35.9.9 executes a multi-stage downloader on require. It fetches a binary payload over HTTPS from Cloudflare Workers hosts oob-worker[.]cf101-adf[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf99-9b3[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf100-416[.]workers[.]dev, and oob-worker[.]cf103-070[.]workers[.]dev at paths /pkg/package, /pkg/package-arm64, /pkg/loader_mac, or /pkg/package.exe depending on platform. If those fail it falls back to a DNS-TXT exfil channel via c[.]sdk[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru (also sdk[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, ext[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, pkg[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, net[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru). The downloaded payload is written to /var/tmp/.cache_<hex> (or dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe under TEMP on Windows), made executable, and launched detached via cmd.exe /c start /b or /bin/sh -c '... &'.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Aug 5, 2026, 01:00 PM
- analyzed
- Aug 5, 2026, 01:10 PM
Related advisories
- bigops-ui-themes@35.6.5
- bigops-tinkoff-telephony-mock@35.5.1
- bigops-telephony-ui-adapter@35.6.4
- bigops-ui-kit@35.9.2
- bigops-timeline@35.4.9
- bigops-tslint@35.9.4
- bigops-tasks-client@35.1.2
- bigops-stylelint@35.4.3
Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.