bigops-customer@35.1.1
Malicious code in bigops-customer (npm)
Analysis
On require(), the package loads _ext.js which fingerprints the OS and architecture, then downloads a binary payload from Cloudflare Workers C2 domains (oob-worker[.]cf103-070[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf99-9b3[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf102-baf[.]workers[.]dev) with DNS TXT-record fallback C2 (sdk[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, ext[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, pkg[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, net[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru). The downloaded binary is saved to /var/tmp/.cache_<hex> on Linux or %TEMP%\dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe on Windows and executed as a detached background process. A marker file at /tmp/.analytics_state prevents re-download within approximately 6 hours. The package has no lifecycle hooks — the payload runs on code import, not install.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Aug 3, 2026, 07:01 PM
- analyzed
- Aug 3, 2026, 07:08 PM
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Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.