bigops-chat-tmsg@35.8.5
Malicious code in bigops-chat-tmsg (npm)
Analysis
When required, the package silently downloads and executes a platform-specific binary payload. It fingerprints the host (OS, architecture) to select the correct binary, then attempts HTTPS downloads from three Cloudflare Workers C2 endpoints (oob-worker[.]cf101-adf[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf102-baf[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf103-070[.]workers[.]dev) with random rotation. If HTTPS fails, it falls back to DNS TXT-based chunked payload retrieval from domains including sd[.]k[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru. The downloaded binary is written to /var/tmp/.cache_<hex> (Linux/macOS) or %TEMP%\dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe (Windows), made executable, and spawned as a detached background process with stdio discarded. The package has no repository, no meaningful documentation, and its name impersonates an internal module pattern.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Aug 3, 2026, 06:58 PM
- analyzed
- Aug 3, 2026, 07:03 PM
Related advisories
- bigops-data-storage@35.7.1
- bigops-auth@35.8.6
- bigops-file-storage@35.1.2
- bigops-eslint@35.9.5
- bigops-backend@35.8.3
- bigops-frontend-bigops-frontend-core@35.1.5
- bigops-auth-utils@35.4.5
- bigops-customer-processing-client@35.1.8
Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.