bigops-auth-utils@35.4.5
Malicious code in bigops-auth-utils (npm)
Analysis
At require-time, bigops-auth-utils@35.4.5 downloads a platform-specific binary payload from Cloudflare Workers C2 infrastructure and executes it as a detached background process. The package fingerprints the host (OS, architecture, CPU count, memory) to select the correct binary, then attempts HTTPS downloads from three C2 endpoints: oob-worker[.]cf100-416[.]workers[.]dev/pkg/package, oob-worker[.]cf103-070[.]workers[.]dev/pkg/package, and oob-worker[.]cf101-adf[.]workers[.]dev/pkg/package. If HTTPS fails, it falls back to DNS TXT-record-based delivery via c[.]sdk[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru. The downloaded payload is written to /var/tmp/.cache_<random> (Linux/macOS) or %TEMP%\dotnet_diag_<random>.exe (Windows) and spawned as a detached, unref'd process. A marker file at /tmp/.analytics_state prevents re-downloading within approximately 6 hours. The package has no lifecycle hooks — the dropper runs synchronously when the module is required.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Aug 3, 2026, 06:55 PM
- analyzed
- Aug 3, 2026, 06:58 PM
Related advisories
- bigops-customer-processing-client@35.1.8
- bigops-api-mobile@35.6.2
- accounts-appointment@33.2.6
- aasp-tent-aasp-tent-core@0.0.2
- statist-statist-core@20.9.9
- tinkoff-statist-browser-typed-client-mb.reliability.android.events@20.5.4
- tinkoff-component-infopanel@20.8.3
- invest-module-cookie@20.8.2
Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.