bigops-communication-client@35.8.8
Malicious code in bigops-communication-client (npm)
Analysis
On require(), the package resolves the host platform and architecture, then downloads a binary payload from one of several Cloudflare Workers C2 endpoints (oob-worker[.]cf102-baf[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf100-416[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf103-070[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf99-9b3[.]workers[.]dev). If the HTTP fetch fails, it falls back to retrieving the payload via DNS TXT record lookups on wel1[.]ru subdomains (sdk[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, ext[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, pkg[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, net[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru). The downloaded binary is written to /var/tmp (or %TEMP% on Windows) with a randomized name, made executable, and spawned as a detached background process. The package has no repository, no lifecycle hooks, and was published at version 35.8.8 with no prior versions — the high version number and name are designed to appear as a legitimate internal SDK update.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Aug 3, 2026, 06:59 PM
- analyzed
- Aug 3, 2026, 07:00 PM
Related advisories
- bigops-auth-utils@35.4.5
- bigops-customer-processing-client@35.1.8
- bigops-api-mobile@35.6.2
- accounts-appointment@33.2.6
- aasp-tent-aasp-tent-core@0.0.2
- statist-statist-core@20.9.9
- tinkoff-statist-browser-typed-client-mb.reliability.android.events@20.5.4
- tinkoff-component-infopanel@20.8.3
Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.