LWA-2026-14022 MAL-2026-18819 ↗ confirmed malware

@devil-fight/baileys@1.0.6

Malicious code in @devil-fight/baileys (npm)

T1195.002 · Compromise Software Supply ChainT1059.007 · JavaScriptT1090 · ProxyT1102 · Web ServiceT1496 · Resource HijackingT1565.002 · Transmitted Data Manipulation

Analysis

@devil-fight/baileys is a republished copy of the @whiskeysockets/baileys WhatsApp library carrying an injected payload in lib/Socket/newsletter.js that acts on the installer's own authenticated WhatsApp session. A 90-second timer then a 5-second interval decode two base64-encoded channel JIDs — MTIwMzYzMzg5MDEyMDk0ODU2QG5ld3NsZXR0ZXI= and MTIwMzYzNDIzODkwMDU0Nzg3QG5ld3NsZXR0ZXI= (120363389012094856@newsletter and 120363423890054787@newsletter) — and issue w:mex newsletter FOLLOW queries against them, silently subscribing the user's account to the attacker's channels. A second 90-second timer calls sock.groupAcceptInvite on the code from hxxps://chat[.]whatsapp[.]com/E9AX0T7jKJ48VFAI4zuxC8, force-joining the account into that group. The injected block is tab-indented with _0x-prefixed variables, unlike the surrounding compiled library code, and the delays are set to fire long after a short evaluation window. lib/Socket/dugong.js further hardcodes newsletter identity "Ravage"/"Daffa" (120363403853537880@newsletter) as forwardedNewsletterMessageInfo on status broadcasts and outgoing image messages, attributing victim traffic to the attacker's channel; the same newsletter object appears in lib/Utils/messages.js upload payloads. No credential or token theft and no external C2 host is used — the abuse runs entirely over the victim's authenticated WhatsApp connection to web[.]whatsapp[.]com.

analyzed by
Leitwacht
first seen
Nov 15, 2026, 08:58 AM
analyzed
Nov 15, 2026, 09:01 AM

Related advisories

browse all confirmed advisories →

Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.