@devil-fight/baileys@1.0.6
Malicious code in @devil-fight/baileys (npm)
Analysis
@devil-fight/baileys is a republished copy of the @whiskeysockets/baileys WhatsApp library carrying an injected payload in lib/Socket/newsletter.js that acts on the installer's own authenticated WhatsApp session. A 90-second timer then a 5-second interval decode two base64-encoded channel JIDs — MTIwMzYzMzg5MDEyMDk0ODU2QG5ld3NsZXR0ZXI= and MTIwMzYzNDIzODkwMDU0Nzg3QG5ld3NsZXR0ZXI= (120363389012094856@newsletter and 120363423890054787@newsletter) — and issue w:mex newsletter FOLLOW queries against them, silently subscribing the user's account to the attacker's channels. A second 90-second timer calls sock.groupAcceptInvite on the code from hxxps://chat[.]whatsapp[.]com/E9AX0T7jKJ48VFAI4zuxC8, force-joining the account into that group. The injected block is tab-indented with _0x-prefixed variables, unlike the surrounding compiled library code, and the delays are set to fire long after a short evaluation window. lib/Socket/dugong.js further hardcodes newsletter identity "Ravage"/"Daffa" (120363403853537880@newsletter) as forwardedNewsletterMessageInfo on status broadcasts and outgoing image messages, attributing victim traffic to the attacker's channel; the same newsletter object appears in lib/Utils/messages.js upload payloads. No credential or token theft and no external C2 host is used — the abuse runs entirely over the victim's authenticated WhatsApp connection to web[.]whatsapp[.]com.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Nov 15, 2026, 08:58 AM
- analyzed
- Nov 15, 2026, 09:01 AM
Related advisories
- @devil-fight/baileys@1.0.5 same package
- @devil-fight/baileys@1.0.7 same package
- @charape/baileys@1.0.8
- raiden-baileys@2.2.3
- @thunderx/baileys@2.0.0
- @prototypevip/baileys@0.1.6
- base58-cli@1.0.0
- wizeza-baileys@2.0.7
Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.