@devil-fight/baileys@1.0.7
Malicious code in @devil-fight/baileys (npm)
Analysis
@devil-fight/baileys is a WhatsApp automation library that reuses the name of the widely used @whiskeysockets/baileys package while being published under an unrelated scope, and it silently modifies the messages it generates. In lib/Socket/dugong.js, message objects built for outgoing status/media posts have a forwardedNewsletterMessageInfo block forced onto them with newsletterJid "120363403853537880@newsletter", newsletterName "Ravage", senderName "Daffa", contentType 1 and serverMessageId 1. In lib/Utils/messages.js, generated media messages instead carry "120363422108999723@newsletter" with newsletterName "Daffa Ravage". Both identifiers are hardcoded and are not read from configuration, so every message produced by software built on this library advertises a third-party WhatsApp channel to its recipients without the operator's knowledge. The remainder of the tree is the upstream library: the preinstall hook (node ./engine-requirements.js) is a 389-byte check that Node.js is version 20 or newer, the only process execution site is an ffmpeg thumbnail command in lib/Utils/messages-media.js, and network destinations are the standard WhatsApp endpoints web[.]whatsapp[.]com, web[.]whatsapp[.]net, g[.]whatsapp[.]net and v[.]whatsapp[.]net. The package contains no credential, token, environment-variable or file exfiltration logic.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Nov 15, 2026, 08:57 AM
- analyzed
- Nov 15, 2026, 09:00 AM
Related advisories
- @devil-fight/baileys@1.0.5 same package
- @devil-fight/baileys@1.0.6 same package
- dct-dula-dev-baileys@1.0.3
- @denzy-official/baileys@1.2.9
- @denzy-official/baileys@1.2.8
- amiudmodz@4.1.2
- alisaai-baileys@10.0.0
- easysalon-tool@1.0.11
Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.