LWA-2026-13999 confirmed malware

sauruspro-bail@5.3.2

Malicious code in sauruspro-bail (npm)

T1195.002 · Compromise Software Supply ChainT1059.007 · JavaScriptT1071.001 · Web ProtocolsT1105 · Ingress Tool Transfer

Analysis

sauruspro-bail, a fork of the Baileys WhatsApp Web API library, contains a hidden block in lib/Socket/newsletter.js that subscribes the connected WhatsApp account to attacker-chosen channels. The URL of the channel list is stored base64-encoded as "aHR0cHM6Ly9wdXNoLXNhdXJ1cy55b3J1bmltZS5zYnMvaWRjaC5qc29u", decoding to hxxps://push-saurus[.]yorunime[.]sbs/idch[.]json — a host unrelated to WhatsApp/Meta. Ten seconds after the newsletter socket is created (i.e. on every client initialisation, with no user action and no newsletter call), the code fetches that JSON with global fetch, iterates the entries' 'idch' arrays, and calls the newsletter follow query for each JID, staggering them 5 seconds apart with setTimeout; every error is silently swallowed with `catch {}`. Because the list is fetched from the remote host at runtime, the publisher can change which channels victims are enrolled into at any time, and the base64 encoding exists only to keep the destination out of plaintext review. The behaviour is unconditional and is not gated by the package's own autoFollow option. The same block is present in versions 5.3.2 and 5.3.3. Versions 5.3.2 and 5.3.3 also declare a dependency range on cache-manager (^7.2.8).

analyzed by
Leitwacht
first seen
Nov 15, 2026, 01:52 AM
analyzed
Nov 15, 2026, 04:22 AM
weekly installs
1,843

Related advisories

browse all confirmed advisories →

Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.