LWA-2026-13688 confirmed malware

@yuanjielab/cli@0.8.2

Malicious code in @yuanjielab/cli (npm)

T1195.002 · Compromise Software Supply ChainT1105 · Ingress Tool TransferT1059 · Command and Scripting InterpreterT1082 · System Information Discovery

Analysis

The package's postinstall hook (scripts/postinstall.js, invoked as `node scripts/postinstall.js`) downloads an opaque, platform-specific executable at install time and runs it. It fetches hxxps://ai-ass-file[.]oss-cn-hangzhou[.]aliyuncs[.]com/yj-cli/versions/<version>.json, picks the entry for the current <goos>_<goarch>, downloads the referenced file from the same bucket, verifies it against a sha256 listed in that same manifest — a manifest fetched over the same unauthenticated channel from the same host, so the check cannot detect a substituted or poisoned distribution point — then writes it to vendor/yj with mode 0755 and immediately executes it (execFileSync(target, ['version','--json'])). The downloaded binary is not part of the published tarball, so its contents are publisher-controlled at install time and invisible to package review. The shipped bin entry bin/yj.js simply spawns vendor/yj with inherited stdio, so every later invocation runs the downloaded payload. Distribution endpoints: hxxps://ai-ass-file[.]oss-cn-hangzhou[.]aliyuncs[.]com/yj-cli/versions/&lt;version&gt;.json and hxxps://ai-ass-file[.]oss-cn-hangzhou[.]aliyuncs[.]com/yj-cli/&lt;relative-path&gt;.

analyzed by
Leitwacht
first seen
Nov 5, 2026, 09:20 AM
analyzed
Nov 5, 2026, 09:20 AM
weekly installs
1,803

Related advisories

browse all confirmed advisories →

Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.