@yuanjielab/cli@0.14.0
Malicious code in @yuanjielab/cli (npm)
Analysis
The package's postinstall hook (node scripts/postinstall.js) contacts hxxps://ai-ass-file[.]oss-cn-hangzhou[.]aliyuncs[.]com/yj-cli/versions/<version>.json, selects a build for the host's OS/architecture (darwin|linux|windows × amd64|arm64), and downloads a platform-specific native executable from the paths listed in that manifest under /yj-cli/bin/. It writes the file to vendor/yj with mode 0755 (mode 0755, written to a .downloading temp name then renamed) and executes it via execFileSync with the arguments "version --json". The only integrity check is a sha256 value taken from the same manifest served by the same object-storage bucket, so whoever controls that bucket controls which native code runs on the installing machine; the executable is not contained in the npm tarball and is not covered by the registry signature. The bin entry bin/yj.js then spawns the downloaded vendor/yj binary with inherited stdio. The environment variables YJ_DOWNLOAD_BASE (redirects the download host) and YJ_SKIP_DOWNLOAD (skips the download, leaving the bin shim to fail with an explicit error) alter this behaviour. IOC: host ai-ass-file[.]oss-cn-hangzhou[.]aliyuncs[.]com, paths /yj-cli/versions/<version>.json and /yj-cli/bin/<platform-file>.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Nov 10, 2026, 04:32 PM
- analyzed
- Nov 10, 2026, 04:33 PM
- weekly installs
- 1,803
Related advisories
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- @yuanjielab/cli@0.12.0 same package
- @yuanjielab/cli@0.11.0 same package
- @yuanjielab/cli@0.10.2 same package
- @yuanjielab/cli@0.10.1 same package
- @yuanjielab/cli@0.9.0 same package
Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.