LWA-2026-13668 confirmed malware

quiche-tea-curut@4.3.4

Malicious code in quiche-tea-curut (npm)

T1195.002 · Compromise Software Supply ChainT1059.007 · JavaScriptT1059 · Command and Scripting Interpreter

Analysis

`quiche-tea-curut` is a stock `create-next-app` project that additionally ships `autopublish2.js`, an unattended npm mass-publish loop. Read directly, that script: strips `private: true` from `package.json` and rewrites the file; replaces `version` with a random `1-4.1-4.1-4` string; picks a random name from a ~160-entry fruit/food word list and sets the package name to `<random-word>-tea-curut`, writing the same name into `package-lock.json`; then runs `npm publish --access public` via `child_process.exec`. After a 30-second delay it restarts the whole cycle, republishing under a new random name and version indefinitely, and it only pauses when the registry returns `429 Too Many Requests`. The script only reads and writes its own `package.json` and `package-lock.json` — it deletes nothing, reads no credential files, and contacts nothing beyond the npm registry. The randomized name and version per iteration is what produces the `<random-word>-tea-curut` package family, i.e. automated flooding of the registry with a fresh package identity each cycle. The published tarball declares no lifecycle hook, so this automation does not run when the package is installed; the installer-relevant content is the Next.js template itself. The only network destination present in the package is the npm registry publish command; there is no other host, IP, or callback address in the code.

analyzed by
Leitwacht
first seen
Nov 5, 2026, 05:05 AM
analyzed
Nov 5, 2026, 05:07 AM

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Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.