southern_duck_tan-16@2.4.3
Malicious code in southern_duck_tan-16 (npm)
Analysis
The package ships three Node scripts (autopublish.js, autopublish2.js, autopublish3.js) that automate mass publication of randomly named copies of itself to the npm registry. Each script reads package.json and package-lock.json, replaces the package `name` with a generated string — fruit and food words with a "-notthedevs" suffix in autopublish.js, adjective/animals/colors combinations plus a random number in autopublish3.js — rewrites `version` to a random 1-4.1-4.1-4 value, writes both files back to disk, and then runs `exec('npm publish --access public')`, re-scheduling itself with setTimeout to repeat indefinitely (about every 10 seconds in autopublish3.js, every 1–5 minutes in autopublish.js, with a 429 rate-limit branch). The package's own name follows the generator's adjective-animal-colour-number scheme, so this publish is itself an output of that loop, and the tarball re-ships the loop that produced it. package.json also declares an unused runtime dependency, `elswary`, that none of the shipped scripts require. Nothing executes at install time — there is no lifecycle hook, and the scripts act only when invoked manually as `node autopublish.js` (as described in README.md, which presents unlimited randomised re-publishing as the intended use). The only network destination the code reaches is the npm registry through the npm CLI; there is no hardcoded host, no token or credential file read, no obfuscation, and no eval/atob decoding.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Nov 4, 2026, 09:05 AM
- analyzed
- Nov 4, 2026, 09:07 AM
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Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.