@stellarshift/abi-tools@1.0.1
Malicious code in @stellarshift/abi-tools (npm)
T1059.007 · JavaScriptT1059.004 · Unix ShellT1105 · Ingress Tool TransferT1082 · System Information DiscoveryT1195.002 · Compromise Software Supply Chain
Analysis
The postinstall hook (scripts/postinstall.js) is a targeted dropper. It only activates on macOS/Windows machines that have both Lark/Feishu and FortiClient installed, then downloads a payload from hxxps://mexc-1258433570[.]cos[.]ap-beijing[.]myqcloud[.]com/abi-tool-damon and executes it via `curl -fsSL ... | bash` (or `powershell iwr | iex` on Windows), running silently in the background with errors suppressed. The bundled index.js is a benign Ethereum ABI selector library; the malicious behaviour lives entirely in the install hook.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Sep 2, 2026, 12:59 PM
- analyzed
- Sep 2, 2026, 01:00 PM
Related advisories
- @stellarshift/chain-metadata@1.0.1
- @stellarshift/evm-address-kit@1.0.1
- @stellarshift/token-units@1.0.1
- cbc97b7a@1.1787999998.0
- grafeno-payments@1.0.0
- grafeno-billing@1.0.0
- spc_login@1.0.0
- spc-grafeno-login@1.0.0
Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.