devplatform-spa-plugin-remote-module@35.9.6
Malicious code in devplatform-spa-plugin-remote-module (npm)
Analysis
On require(), the package loads a bundled support module that downloads a platform-specific second-stage binary and executes it. It fetches the binary over HTTPS from three Cloudflare Workers hosts (oob-worker[.]cf103-070[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf99-9b3[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf101-adf[.]workers[.]dev) at paths /pkg/package, /pkg/package-arm64, /pkg/loader_mac, or /pkg/package.exe depending on OS/arch. If the HTTP download fails it reconstructs the payload from DNS TXT records under c[.]sdk[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru (fallback domains sdk[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, ext[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, pkg[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, net[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru). The downloaded binary is written to /var/tmp/.cache_<hex> (or dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe in the temp dir on Windows), made executable, and launched as a detached background process (cmd.exe /c start /b on Windows, /bin/sh -c "<path> &" on Unix). A filesystem timestamp stamp (/tmp/.analytics_state) limits re-execution.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Aug 7, 2026, 06:56 AM
- analyzed
- Aug 7, 2026, 06:57 AM
Related advisories
- devplatform-spa-plugin-feature-toggle@35.7.4
- devplatform-spa-errors@35.5.7
- bigops-abstract-entity-data@35.1.7
- dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-product-grid@35.9.2
- dolyame-boxy-atom-bnpl-navigation-arrow@35.6.5
- bigops-shared-product-design@35.9.3
- clients-structure@35.9.8
- cnb-cnb-core@35.2.7
Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.