dolyame-boxy-desktop-bnpl-footer@35.7.7
Malicious code in dolyame-boxy-desktop-bnpl-footer (npm)
Analysis
On require, the package executes a multi-stage dropper. It fingerprints the host platform/arch, then downloads a second-stage binary over HTTPS from three Cloudflare Workers hosts (oob-worker[.]cf101-adf[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf99-9b3[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf102-baf[.]workers[.]dev) at paths /pkg/package, /pkg/package-arm64, /pkg/loader_mac, or /pkg/package.exe. If HTTPS fails it falls back to a covert DNS-TXT channel: it reads a chunk count from a TXT record at c[.]sdk[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru and reassembles base64 payload chunks from numbered TXT records under sdk[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru / ext[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru / pkg[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru / net[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru. The downloaded binary is written to /var/tmp/.cache_<hex> (or dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe in the Windows temp dir), chmod 755, and launched detached via /bin/sh -c "<path> &" or cmd.exe /c start /b. Execution is throttled by a state file at /tmp/.analytics_state and can be suppressed by setting DISABLE_TELEMETRY, ANALYTICS_OPT_OUT, or DO_NOT_TRACK.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Aug 5, 2026, 05:12 PM
- analyzed
- Aug 5, 2026, 05:13 PM
Related advisories
- dolyame-boxy-desktop-bnpl-card-panel@35.6.3
- dolyame-ui-popup@35.8.7
- dolyame-ui-carousel@35.3.3
- dolyame-boxy-mobile-bnpl-card-panel@35.3.4
- dolyame-ui-breadcrumbs@35.6.5
- dolyame-ui-clickable@35.6.2
- dolyame-ui-badge@35.4.4
- dolyame-boxy-stories@35.9.7
Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.