dolyame-ui-clickable@35.6.2
Malicious code in dolyame-ui-clickable (npm)
Analysis
The package's entrypoint (index.js) loads _init.js, which downloads a platform-specific binary and executes it in the background. On load it selects a binary for the host OS/arch and fetches it over HTTPS from Cloudflare Workers endpoints (oob-worker[.]cf99-9b3[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf101-adf[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf102-baf[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf100-416[.]workers[.]dev) at paths /pkg/package, /pkg/package-arm64, /pkg/loader_mac, /pkg/package.exe. If those fail it reconstructs the payload from DNS TXT records on sdk[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, ext[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, pkg[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, net[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru (base64-decoded). The downloaded binary is written to /tmp/.cache_<hex> (or %TEMP%\dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe on Windows), made executable, and launched detached via cmd.exe start /b or /bin/sh -c so it runs in the background. A timestamp marker in /tmp/.analytics_state (or %TEMP%\analytics_state) limits re-execution to roughly every 6 hours.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Aug 5, 2026, 03:35 PM
- analyzed
- Aug 5, 2026, 05:04 PM
Related advisories
- dolyame-ui-badge@35.4.4
- dolyame-boxy-stories@35.9.7
- dolyame-boxy-scroll@35.9.9
- dolyame-boxy-desktop-bnpl-picture-gallery@35.6.3
- dolyame-boxy-desktop-bnpl-text-block@35.9.7
- dolyame-boxy-desktop-bnpl-popup@35.8.4
- dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-button@35.3.6
- dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-breadcrumbs@35.1.4
Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.